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PetSmart Searches for a Sustainable Strategy
Abstract
This case details a PetSmart’s struggle to find a sustainable strategy. It was started as a
“big box” pet specialty category killer store in 1986. It went public in 1993 and rapidly
expanded through acquisition. It focused on product variety and price which put it in
direct competition with mass merchants, especially discounters and wholesale clubs.
Loses in the 1990s led the company to hire Philip Francis to turn the operation around.
As a result of restructuring dictated by Mr. Francis, PetSmart became profitable. Its
supply chain was improved by adding distribution centers, standardizing and down-sizing
stores, improving product quality, increasing services offered, moving away from a low
price orientation, and developing a customer and pet friendly in-store experience. Robert
Moran took over leadership of PetSmart in 2009. His emphasis has been on realizing the
humanization of pets as members of the family, focusing on PetSmart’s target market,
increasing store productivity, and adding new stores more slowly.
The Pet Market in the USA
Americans love pets. In fact, approximately 62 percent of households have at least one
pet. They own approximately 172 million fresh water fish, 94 million cats, 78 million
dogs, 15 million birds, 14 million small animals, 13 million horses and 11 million salt
water fish. Total spending on pets for 2010 is estimated at $47.7 billion. Pet food alone
accounts for $17.6 billion followed by vet care at $12 billion, supplies/OTC medicine at
$10.4 billion, pet services at $3.4 and animal purchases at $2.2 billion1. Table 1 below
itemizes the average annual cost of maintaining of maintaining dogs and cats by category
of spending. It shows that while pet food is important other expenses, especially
veterinarian expenses, make up a larger portion of the total.
Table 1 Average Annual Amount Spent on Dogs and Cats
Cost category
Dogs
Cats
Surgical vet visits
$555
$278
Kennel boarding
273
225
Food
229
203
Routine vet visits
225
203
Groomer/grooming aids
66
22
Treats
4
37
Vitamins
61
28
Toys
40
19
Source: American Pet Products Association, 2012
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Retail Structure/Competition
Because the market for pet food is large, it is sold through numerous retail
channels: supermarkets, pet superstores, mass marketers, farm and feed stores, vets and
kennels, warehouse clubs, and other stores. More recently dollar stores, drug stores and
internet retailers have expanded their offerings in pet food, accessories and medical
related items. Table 2 below details the share of sales by channel and the sales trend 2.
The U.S. Census of Retail Trade reported 7,626 pet and pet food supply stores with sales
of $7.6 billion in 2002. Five years later there were 8,782 stores with sales of $11.4
billion. Average sales per store jumped 29 percent to almost $1.3 million. The industry
was highly fragmented until 1990 when pet food superstores like PetsMart and PETCO
began a consolidation of the industry. The 2007 Census shows the top four firms with
2,039 stores, $7.1 billion in sales and average store sales of almost $3.5 million. The
remaining stores averaged only $641,000 in sales3. Clearly, the big box category killer
superstores are marginalizing the smaller stores and firms.

Channel
Supermarkets
Pet superstores
Mass merchandisers
Farm and feed stores
Vets and kennels
Warehouse clubs
Other

Table 2
Pet Food Distribution Channels
Share of Sales
39
21
22
8
7
3
7

Trend
Up
Up
Up
Flat
Flat
Up
Down

Source: Mintel, The Pet Food & Supplies Market, 2007
PetsMart’s Situation (1999-2001)
In 2001, PetsMart was a national pet retailer operating 484 stores. It started in 1986,
went public in 1993, and grew rapidly mainly through acquisition of regional specialty
stores4 (see Appendix A). As a publicly traded company (PETM), it was experiencing
stagnant growth across the chain and a declining stock price ($29 to two dollars a share
from 1997 to 2001). Gross profit had declined by three percentage points from 2000, and
operating costs had climbed seven percentage points, negatively impacting the bottom
line. Growth from new stores was also problematic. Incremental store openings totaled
just one from 1999 to 2001. Sales per square foot were declining: in 1999 sales averaged
$177 per square foot, 2000 sales averaged $163, and 2001 sales averaged $160.
Comparable store sales growth was equally alarming at 6.3 percent, 4.6 percent, and 1.4
percent in 1999, 2000, and 2001 respectively. Debt to equity was sharply rising, with
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PetsMart reporting negative asset gains from 1999 to 2001. PetsMart’s costs were
growing quickly, with no offset from revenues5 (See Appendix B).
The problems faced by PetsMart could be attributed to their warehouse strategy, which
offered bulk product at the best price. Stores operated on low labor costs and minimal
services resulting in a lower price. Supply chain issues were part of PetsMart’s problem,
with Mr. Francis commenting that “PetsMart's distribution model was of 1960’s design”.
Challenges affecting PetsMart included:




30 day lead time for product to reach stores.
36,000 square foot stores with 16,000 square feet dedicated to back stock.
$750,000 tied up in inventory at each location.

PetsMart also realized very little revenue from ancillary services. In 2001, ancillary
services, such a grooming, accounted for five percent of total sales with little room to
expand6.
PetsMart’s downward spiral was due to competition, distribution, and supply chain
inefficiencies.
PetsMart’s competition came primarily from two sources:
mass
channels such as Walmart and Target, and pet specialty channels such as PETCO and
regional independents. Mass channels were price focused; building their brands on value
and convenience. During 2001, mass retailer Wal-Mart was expanding at a rapid rate.
They were nearing 3,500 stores nationwide, and located within five miles of most
American residences. With Walmart controlling price, scale, and customer traffic at their
supercenters, competing head-to-head on a price strategy guaranteed little chance of
survival. Target’s approach was similar to Walmart’s. They targeted Wal-Mart's low
price and increased theirs by a few cents. Target was more concerned about creating a
customer experience to attract the middle income shopper rather than competing on price
alone. In contrast to Target, Mr. Francis commented “in 2001, PetsMart looked like
Home Depot having a bad day”6. Their warehouse store was under a price attack by
mass competition, and their stores were not in position to offer consumers a differentiated
shopping experience. Mass channels were driving the margins out of consumables,
pulling customers into their stores to capitalize on profitable hard goods.
With PetsMart trying to combat the increased competition on price from the mass
channels, PETCO and other independent channels began challenging PetsMart
distribution. Offering similar brands and products, PETCO was winning with a customer
service approach. Their core customers looked to “pamper” their pets, through upscale
goods and consumables. They were not as concerned about mass channel attack on price,
as their profitability involved higher price points to drive profit margin. In PETCO’s
model, guests were willing to trade price for an improved shopping experience. PETCO
3

maintained steady growth, and their distribution outlets were similar in number to
PetsMart's.
Another issue pressing the survival of PetsMart was the change in product distribution
driven by venders. In 2001 Procter and Gamble decided that their newly acquired brand
Iams was suited for broader distribution. In 2000 Iams was sold exclusively through pet
specialty channels and independent retailers. Iams was introduced into the mass channel
in 2001, instantly causing a negative effect on PetsMart’s sales. The volume loss from
competition on a differentiating brand was substantial, as was the reduction in consumers
entering the store. Mr. Francis concluded that “Initially Iams going mass costs us two
percent in sales revenue, and two percent due to [consumer] trip revenue.6” Procter and
Gamble was not the only major brand opening distribution to mass channels, multiple
vendors followed suit, fueling a price war.
In 2000 PetsMart stores had about 700 square feet dedicated to services, primarily
grooming. Services accounted for three and a half percent of total store space. “We used
to have to conduct [dog] training in the backroom.” Ancillary services at PetsMart
initially had little traction. “There has always been a market for boarding dogs and cats,
usually by a mom and pop facility. Boarding locations were systematically undercapitalized.” Veterinary services were inexistent as were day care offerings for working
or vacationing families’ pets. Service was not a part of PetsMart’s warehouse strategy,
nor was online shopping. PETS.COM, a competing e-retailer, quickly realized what Mr.
Francis described as a “density of volume” problem. “A $20 bag of dog food costs $20
to ship. A $60 Dog-Gloo costs $60 to ship.6”
PetsMart was competing in an industry whose profitability anchored on hard goods such
as leashes and toys, yet whose survival was conjoined with consumables such as food and
treats. Low margin consumables were used to drive customers to the store, in which they
would then fill their shopping carts with high margin hard goods. Consumables were
split by species, with dog items anchoring sales with 80 percent of total volume. Within
the consumable side of the business, the major players included Mars (Nutro), Purina,
Masterfoods, and Procter and Gamble (Iams). Each brand also distributed product
offerings across various types of retailer. In order to encourage trading-up, pet stores
place their premium products on front shelves, and the widely distributed grocery and
mass products in the back of the store.
Decisions to Be Made
Before joining PetsMart as president and chief executive officer in March 1998, Mr.
Francis was president and CEO of Shaw's Supermarkets and corporate vice president of
wholesale for Roundy's, Inc. He had spent his career in and around the grocery channel,
4

and understood the power of supply chain, operations, and retail administration. He had
been on the board of directors for PetsMart since 1989, but as he said in a college
presentation, “you learn quickly that middle managers have a better idea of where the
company is heading, than the members of the board.”1 Mr. Francis’ time spent as a
member of the board turned into full control after a planned succession fell through.
Upon becoming CEO, Mr. Francis was very concerned about how to build trust. “I was
very careful to watch how I used my pronouns when I joined PetsMart. I made sure I
asked ‘how is our business’ instead of ‘how is your business’. I always framed it as
though I had been there for years by asking ‘what did we do…”7
Mr. Francis immediately began laying the groundwork for future growth. “We started off
pretty sober, knowing that of every five turnarounds, four are not successful. If there's
anything we did to begin the turnaround process, it's simply that we took the view that we
needed to fix the core business and its broken elements. At that time, we weren't focused
on growth, on branding, or on any of the fancy things. We had a company where
inadequate infrastructure was the issue, and we methodically began with that work first.”8
Mr. Francis entered the business competing against “category killers”, retailers standing
on two legs – dominant variety and dominant price. With the colossal growth of
Walmart, who was offering exceptional variety and price, “I saw the need to add more
legs to the two-legged stool. Why [would consumers] come to a bad looking store just
for price?” Continuing to compete head to head with mass retailers solely on price was
not an option for PetSmart.6
Pressure on product assortment was also a concern. When Mr. Francis took control of
PetsMart in 1999, he presented a challenge to senior management. “What happens when
one of our key exclusive brands go mass?”6 Mr. Francis began generating ideas to
combat such a problem, so when Iams began distribution into the mass channel in 2001,
PetSmart was prepared. Mr. Francis was also looking at ways to utilize scale, and ways
to create an environment that would offer more then just low priced dog food.
From PetsMart to PetSmart
Upon assuming control Mr. Francis immediately began drawing from previous
experience to identify inefficiencies in the supply chain. As for profitability measures,
strategically placed distribution centers would weed out almost $80 million of excess
inventory, freeing up cash and increasing the profitability of PetSmart. Distribution
centers would also decrease store inventory and shipment lead times. Within a year of
his assumption of control, PetSmart developed three central distribution centers, two for
consumables and one for hard goods.6
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While working on supply chain issues, Mr. Francis also identified the situation as a
chance to change the dynamics and direction of the company. Mr. Francis systematically
left the warehouse culture and began to focus on shopper experience. He changed the
capitalization of the firm’s name, from PetsMart (The dog food mass merchandiser) to
PetSmart (the place for “pet parents” to find positive ways to improve their pet’s life).
He changed the prototype store to a smaller footprint, from 36,000 square feet to 26,000
square feet, as excess inventory would now be kept in the DCs instead of the back room
of stores. This increased the percentage of selling space and improved store productivity.
He also looked at methods to change the dynamics of the store front. Mr. Francis’
challenge to add “more legs to the stool” soon developed into a winning strategy. “We
became a five legged stool focusing on price, variety, customer service, in-store
experience, and ancillary services.”6 PetSmart was shedding their warehouse pedigree
and looking to create a shopping experience for pet parents and their pets.6
In migrating away from a low price strategy, Mr. Francis identified other potential drivers
for shoppers to enter the store. Pet services were a growing industry, and could be used
to generate loyalty and excitement in store. Grooming services were already in place, but
did not generate the traffic and profitability necessary for growth. PetSmart began
looking at offerings such as veterinarian clinics (PetsHospitals), and day/night care
facilities for owners leaving on work or vacation trips (PetsHotels). Services requiring
less capital were also developed, including pet photography and in-store training. “Pet
Photography is a much bigger, higher margin service then most realize.”6
PetHotels, a day/night care for dogs, began as an idea from the creator of Alpha Graphics,
a Kinko’s-like company with 1,500 stores in 17 countries. When the founder brought the
idea to Mr. Francis, he initially approached the concept with reservation. Initially, Mr.
Francis opened a 5,000 sq. foot addition to a local PetSmart and continually expanded the
idea. With input from customers, and increasing popularity in testing markets, a larger
7,000 square foot PetsHotel was opened. This facility added expanded play space for
dogs, as well as various activities and feeding treats. “Unlike Hilton and Sheraton,
PetHotels business is highest on the weekend, with pet owners leaving out of town.”6
PetHotels offer 24 hour care for visiting pets, clean facilities, and recycled air every two
to three minutes.
“We have a morning snack, which is dairy-free frozen yogurt and afternoon ‘Yappy
Hour’. We also have ‘Doggie Day Camp’ for all our hotel guests. The dogs go to
supervised play time throughout the day. We have a phone booth. The owner can call in,
and your ‘friend’ can meow or bark at you. It's a speakerphone, so if the human is in
tough shape and needs to hear from their dog, we can respond to that need. Our guests
drink filtered water. We turn the air over every few minutes. We have suites that include
6

a cot with a fleece blanket and a television turned to Animal Planet. People are thrilled to
have the choices. It's kind of a guilt reliever for the human who has to abandon their pet
for a short time.”9
One of the reasons PetSmart has been able to capitalize on the PetHotels concept comes
from decisions based on scale. “It costs $1.1 million today to add a PetHotels. It costs
$2.6 million to build a free standing hotel. Expanding a PetHotel involves extreme
capital efficiency.” Mr. Francis also added, “We can also put a vet in there all night to
capitalize on the facilities.” PetSmart currently dedicates 7,700 sq. feet to stores geared
with a PetHotels, roughly 30 percent of a typical 26,000 sq. foot store.6
Another service offering incorporated into the store layout was the joint venture with
Banfield, a highly regarded veterinary company located in the Pacific Northwest.
Banfield was originally founded in 1955, and by 1990 had become a trusted name in pet
care. In-store hospitals were designed to offer convenience to consumers and are
currently targeted toward non-veterinary schools demographics. “Veterinary school
graduates practice close to the schools they attend. Why saturate the market with
PetHospitals?” Mr. Francis described another advantage of multiple ancillary offerings,
“having grooming housed with a vet allows a groomer to question the vet concerning
animal they are working on.”6
In reinventing PetSmart’s image, Mr. Francis brought another key strategy from his
grocery background into the pet specialty channel, loyalty cards. PetSmart’s card,
PetPerks, provided core shoppers with promotional discounts which increased loyalty.
From the company’s perspective, the addition of PetPerks was not just to provide value to
shoppers, but to understand what services were being used and how to cross merchandise.
For example, if PetSmart noticed that a customer was using PetHotels, buying food, but
not taking advantage of grooming services, they would target mail a coupon for a “free
bath”. PetSmart could also identify which promotions drove the highest trips, which
brands commanded the most loyalty, and the impact of price elasticity on their customers.
One of the more strategic choices was the decision not to sell dogs to customers.
PetSmart decided instead to undertake a very aggressive adoption program. It facilitates
approximately 1,100 pet adoptions daily and almost five million since the inception of the
program.10 When customers want to adopt a dog, they begin by searching a PetSmart
sponsored website, 1-800-Save-A-Pet.com. This site enables potential owners to search
for dogs that are available at adoption agencies across the country. They can also search
by characteristics such as size, color, and age. The website also creates an emotional tie
to the pet with photos and profiles available for each animal. This concept has two major
impacts on the business. First, the new owner picks up the adopted pet at a local
PetSmart, and becomes emotionally attached to the PetSmart brand. Second, new pet
7

parents will initially spend several hundred dollars in veterinary services, hard goods, and
consumables.
Thus, the company moved away from a product and low price strategy to a differentiation
strategy emphasizing service, total pet solutions resulting in greater customer loyalty.
With the addition of services, price became less of a liability. Mr. Francis focused on
services to outpace the price value. “One of our big bags of Purina is $20. We try to
price our food within five percent of Wal-Mart. Let’s say on Wal-Mart beats us on price
by $1.50. Would customers be willing to visit a store that provides adoption, training,
grooming, and food for a $1.50 premium?” Shoppers who take advantage of pet services
will pay a slightly higher price for convenience.
Mr. Francis focused on differentiated distribution to drive loyalty and increase revenue.
PetSmart introduced private label offerings and explored niche markets. Many of their
products can only be found in pet specialty channels. High margin super premium brands
and organic products are not currently offered in club, grocery, and mass channels.
PetSmart carries full distribution of bridge (products bridging grocery and specialty –
Iams or Purina ONE) and grocery brands, strategically trying to trade their shoppers up to
premium brands.
Mr. Francis understood the need for an online presence, even though competitor
PETS.COM had failed in the online market. Selling smaller specialty products like
shampoos and hard goods can generate incremental volume online. “We focused on
content and community when looking at an online strategy”.6 Mr. Francis’ criterion for a
successful online site involves driving in-store traffic.
PetSmart made a strategic
decision to discontinue their mail-out circular. Their monthly ads are now online.
PetSmart.com provides vast resources on pet adoption and care, with subtle product
solutions for interested consumers. PetSmart is also trying to defend against low
overhead online giants such as Amazon stealing share in high profit hard goods.
Where is PetSmart today?
Through the leadership of Philip Francis, PetSmart has been transformed from a
struggling price fixated retailer, to a pet care goliath. The pet specialty store segment of
the market is dominated by PetSmart and to a lesser extent PETCO. PetSmart has 1,232
stores with sales of $6.1 billion and a market share of 44.4 percent. PETCO has
approximately 1,000 stores with revenue of $2.9 billion and a market share of 20.7
percent. Other companies include Pet Supplies Plus which operates 239 stores in 22
states, generates $540 million is sales with a market share of 3.6 percent; Pet
Supermarket operates 115 stores in the southeast, California and Nevada, generating
8

$235 million in sales with a market share of 1.6 percent; and Pet Food Express operates
41 stores in northern California, generates sales of $90 million with a market share of less
than one percent.11 The rest of the specialty pet store segment is highly fragmented and
made up of small chains and independent operators.
Philip Francis was succeeded by Robert Moran as president in 2009 and CEO and
chairman in 2012. Prior to joining PetSmart, he was president of Toys ‘R’ Us Canada,
spent 20 years at Sears in various financial and merchandising positions including
president of Sears de Mexico. He was also an executive with Galerias Precidas of
Madrid, Spain.10
Mr. Moran is very excited about the chances for future growth of PetSmart. He sees
PetSmart reaching maturity with 1,800 stores in the U.S. PetSmart currently has 1,232
store including 1,154 in the U.S., 73 in Canada and 5 in Puerto Rico. It typically opens 40
to 50 new stores annually. Stores range in size from 12,000 to 27,500 square feet and
carry approximately 10,000 unique stock keeping units. In addition, it offers pet
grooming and training in all stores plus pet boarding through their PetSmart Hotels or
PetsHotels brands and 799 veterinary hospitals in conjunction with Banfield under the
name Banfield The Pet Hospital. Loyalty is built with their PetPerks program. PetSmart
also connects with pet parents via their e-commerce web site PetSmark.com.10
PetSmart’s vision is “to become the Happiness in Store experience that our
knowledgeable, caring associates deliver to our pet parents each day”. The foundation to
creating an in-store experience by providing solutions that help pets live long, healthy,
happy lives.10 To achieve this requires PetSmart to understand market trends.
The humanization of pets is the major overriding trend. Consumers are increasingly
becoming pet parents who see and treat their pets as members of the family. This has
resulted in premium products in pet foods, many of which are higher priced with higher
gross margins and exclusively available in specialty pet stores. The 2007 melaminecontaminated dog and cat food problem reportedly caused more than 3,500 animal deaths
further reinforced the trend toward natural and organic pet foods. The natural and holistic
food sales market has been growing at a 20 percent annually. 11
Humanization has also impacted sales of pet supplies. Higher quality and personalized
products include monogrammed sweaters, digitized collars, designer clothes and
accessories. Companies like Paul Mitchell, Omaha Steaks, Harley Davidson and Old
Navy are now offering dog shampoo, pet apparel and toys.11
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Humanization has impacted pet services the most. Full service grooming, haircuts, baths,
toenail trimming and tooth brushing are growing in importance. Veterinary services and
medicine are growing even faster with the emphasis on health and longevity. 11
Vet care is estimated at $13.6 billion and pet supplies and over the counter medicine at
$11.8 billion for 2012.1 Concern for obesity and pet health insurance are some other
emerging trends.
How has PetSmart reacted to the trend toward humanization? First their customer insights
programs tracts customers shopping behavior and preferences. They have identified their
target market as female, average age 46, strong emotional bond with pet, wants the best
for her pet, and affluent with income 30 percent higher than the average household and
spends 78 percent more than the average pet owner. The primary focus is on customers
with a “heart” who shop PetSmart 10 or more times a year. This segment accounts for
only 13 percent of their customers, but 51 percent of sales and have an average amount
spent of $657 per year. Their secondary target market is the “smart” customer who shops
PetSmart two to nine times a year. They account for 48 percent of the customers, 41
percent of the sales and average $150 in annual customer spending. The last customer
group is the “mart” segment which accounts for 39 percent of the customers, eight
percent of the sales, but only spends $34 annually.12
Second, PetSmart has increasingly focused on channel-exclusive pet foods. They have
also developed and expanded their proprietary brands. For example, in consumables they
have Great Choice in the good category, Authority and Dentley’s in the better category
and Simply Nourish in the best category. In hard goods they have Great Choice in the
good category, Top Paw and petholiday in the better category and Martha Stewart Pets,
Toys ‘R’ US Pets and GNC in the best category.12
Third, PetSmart continues expanding pet services. It has grooming and training in all of
its stores, 194 PetsHotels, and 800 Banfield, The Pet Hospitals.12 Services sales were
$675 million or 11 percent of total sales in 2011. PetSmart does not include sales of
Banfield which is 20 percent owned by PetSmart.10
Fourth, above all, PetSmart is focusing on the consumer’s in-store experience. Associates
are trained to know customer and pet names. They strive to provide Total Lifetime Care,
Superior Service, clean stores, short check-out lines, a strong in-stock position, an
effective supply chain and outstanding pet care.10
PetSmart’s operating statements and financial position improved significantly in the early
2000s. Sales and profits increased 103 percent and 383 percent between 2002 and 2009,
largely bolstered by the addition approximately 100 new stores a year. Under the
10

leadership of Moran from 2009 to 2011, sales have increased by 21 percent to $6.1
billion and profits have increased by 50 percent to $290 billion. New store growth has
moderated to adding 40 to 50 annually (see Appendix C). Emphasis has shifted to
improving store productivity by pursuing its differentiation strategy and improving its
customer focus, especially on the humanization of animals.
PetSmart’s rapid rise, fall, resurgence and redirection have been challenging. It has
become best in class among the specialty pet store industry, yet it faces continuing
challenges from consumer trends, competitors, suppliers as well as becoming
complacent. Robert Moran and the executive leadership seek was to grow the company
through its differentiation strategy focusing on pet parents and pets Lifetime Care. Has
PetSmart found a sustainable strategy?
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Appendix A: Selected PetSmart Chronology Taken From Annual Reports
1980s Jim and Janice Dougherty run a store called Petfood Supermarket. They develop the
concept of a discount pet food warehouse.
1986

Doughertys secure a venture capital loan from the Phillips Van Heusen Corporation and
become incorporated as Pacific Coast Distributing, Inc.

1987

Doughertys open two stores under the name The Pet Food Warehouse.

1988

Five additional stores are established in Arizona, Colorado, and Texas.

1989

Samuel J. Parker Joins the firm and Phil Francis becomes a Director of the
company

1989

Pet grooming services are offered for the first time in its Colorado store. We
change the name and logo of our stores from PetFood Warehouse to PETsMART.

1990

We contract with a veterinarian company to bring mobile clinics to our stores to perform
vaccinations.

1992

We open our own permanent adoption centers, which we call the Luv-A-Pet Adoption
Center.

1993

PETsMART goes public, listed under the symbol “PETM”.

1994

We reach an agreement with Medical Management International in Portland, Ore., to
operate full-service, state-of-the-art vet clinics in our stores.
Purchased Weisheimer Companies which operated 29 PETZAZZ stores in the Midwest.

1995

Purchased PetStuff and its 56 stores
Purchased Pet Food Giant and its 10 superstores
Purchased Sporting Dog Specialties the leading catalog retailer of pet supplies and
accessories.

1996

Purchased Pet City Holdings, the largers pet specialty retailer in the U.K. that operated
57 Pet City stores.
Entered Canada by opening eight stores in Ontario.
Purchased State Line Tack, the leading catalog retailer that specialized in discount riding
an equine supplies.

1997

Inventory problems are encountered; Sam Parker, President and CEO who took
the company public resigns.
12

The company reports a loss of $34.4 million and stock price falters. Sam Parker,
former President and CEO, resumes the position of CEO to try and get the
company back on track.
1998

Phil Francis becomes our new President and CEO. We begin opening smaller stores
(19,000 square feet vs. 26,000 square feet) in markets that can only support one store.

2000

Our stock price hits an all-time low.

2000

Medical Management International, Inc. operates the 239 vet clinics in our stores under
the name Banfield, The Pet Hospital.

2001

The company begins a new advertising campaign entitled 'PETsMART: All You
Need for the Life of Your Pet.'

2002

We begin testing PETsHOTEL in two of our Phoenix stores. In addition to our two
major distribution centers, we now have six smaller distribution centers in Phoenix;
Ennis, Texas; Gahanna, Ohio; Hagerstown, Md.; Newnan, Ga.; and Reno, Nev.

2003

We finish remodeling our stores, so now all of our stores are more customer and pet
friendly, easy to shop, bright and vibrant.

2004

We open our third major distribution center, which is in Ottawa, Illinois.

2005

We become PetSmart. We continue to update all of our stores.

2006

Services grow by 26 percent. We open our 50th PetsHotel and announce that we plan to
open a total of 435. Our sales for the fiscal year are $4.2 billion and our EPS is $1.33.

2007

Purchase 19 SuperPet stores in Canada.

2009

Robert Moran is appointed Chairman and CEO.
Philip Francis becomes Executive Chairman.

2012

Philip Francis retires.
Robert Moran takes over complete leadership of PetSmart.
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Appendix B ‐‐ From Growth to Crisis
PetSmart Financials FY 1993‐1998
Fiscal Year

2/1/98

2/2/97

1/28/96

1/29/95

1/30/94

1/31/93

1,791

1,501

1,168

924

545

320

Gross Profit ($ in mil.)

434

426

308

246

149

96

Oper., Gen. & Adm. (S in mil.)

412

343

270

238

154

93

Net Income ($ in mil.)

‐34

43

‐9

‐6

‐5

3

Gross Profit

24.2

28.4

26.4

26.6

27.4

30.1

Oper., Gen. & Adm.

23.0

22.9

23.1

25.8

28.3

29.1

Net income

‐1.9

2.8

‐0.7

‐0.7

‐0.9

1.0

Stores at End of Period

468

376

297

269

192

103

Net Sales per Square Foot ($)

177

176

172

162

175

197

Net Sales Growth (%)

19.3

28.5

26.4

69.7

70.4

79.5

Comparable Store Sales Growth (%)

4.6

11.9

12.5

19.1

19.8

19.0

Inventory Turnover (Times/Year)

5.6

5.0

5.5

5.4

5.1

5.4

Average Store Inventory ($ Thousands)

679

800

714

673

561

580

Operating Financials
Net Sales ($ in mil.)

Operating Percentages

Selected Operationg Data

NOTE: Data are rounded.
Source: PetSmart SEC Filings and Annual Reports
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Appendix C ‐‐ Recovery and Refocus
PetSmart Financials
FY 2006‐2011
Fiscal Year

1/29/12

1/31/11

1/31/10

2/1/09

2/3/08

1/28/07

1/29/06

Net Sales
($ in mil.)

6,113

5,694

5,337

5,065

4,673

4,234

3,761

Gross Profit
($ in mil.)

1,804

1,655

1,519

1,495

1,437

1,308

1,173

Oper., Gen. & Adm.
(S in mil.)

1,301

1,226

1,150

1,126

1,085

986

862

290

240

198

193

259

186

183

Gross Profit

29.5

29.1

28.5

29.5

30.7

30.9

31.2

Oper., Gen. & Adm.

21.3

21.5

21.6

22.2

23.2

23.3

22.9

4.7

4.2

3.7

3.8

5.5

4.4

4.9

1,232

1,187

1,149

1,112

1,008

908

826

Net Sales per Square Foot ($)

224

214

205

202

210

208

206

Net Sales Growth (%)

7.4

6.7

5.4

8.4

10.4

12.6

11.8

Comparable Store Sales Growth (%)

5.4

4.8

1.6

3.8

2.4

5.0

4.2

Inventory Turnover (Times/Year)

9.5

9.3

9.5

8.7

9.3

8.7

9.4

Average Store Inventory ($ Thousands)

523

519

490

525

497

537

484

Operating Financials

Net Income
($ in mil.)
Operating Percentages

Net income
Selected Operation Data
Stores at End of Period

NOTES:
Data are rounded,
From PetSmart SEC Filings and Annual
Reports
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Appendix C ‐‐ Recovery and Refocus
(Continued)
PetSmart Financials
FY 1999‐2005
Fiscal Year

1/30/05

2/1/04

2/2/03

2/3/02

1/28/01

1/30/00

2/1/99

Net Sales ($ in mil.)

3,364

2,993

2,695

2,501

2,224

2,110

2,109

Gross Profit ($ in mil.)

1,039

900

783

710

557

572

528

Oper., Gen. & Adm. ($ in mil.)

781

681

630

640

536

484

470

Net Income ($ in mil.)

158

125

79

40

‐31

‐32

23

Gross Profit

30.9

30.0

29.1

28.4

25.0

27.1

25.0

Oper., Gen. & Adm.

23.2

22.8

23.4

25.6

24.1

22.9

22.3

4.7

4.2

1.6

‐1.3

‐1.5

1.1

Stores at End of Period

726

643

583

560

533

484

534

Net Sales per Square Foot ($)

205

197

188

177

161

163

175

Net Sales Growth (%)

12.4

11.1

7.8

12.4

5.4

0.0

17.8

6.3

7.0

9.6

6.5

1.4

4.6

6.3

Inventory Turnover (Times/Year)

10.0

9.7

10.5

9.2

6.9

5.6

6.3

Average Store Inventory ($ Thousands)

465

481

441

485

605

780

686

Operating Financials

Operating Percentages

Net income

2.9

Selected Operating Data

Comparable Store Sales Growth (%)

NOTES: Data are rounded, NA = Not
Available, Source of information – PetSmart
SEC Filings and Annual Reports
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